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Everyone who does not confess that 
Jesus Christ has come in the fl esh is an 
antichrist. . . and whoever perverts the 
words of the Lord. . . and says there is 
neither a resurrection nor a judgment, that 
man is the fi rst-born of Satan. Therefore 
let us abandon the foolishness of the 
great majority and the false teachings, 
and let us return to the Word which was 
transmitted to us from the beginning.
Polycarp, Letter to the Philippians, 7:1-
2 (italics added).
The theology of the word is the end of 
signifi cation and the consummation of 
desire in complete presence, and thus 
the word becomes literally fl esh, the 
word that is a silence transcending the 
entire system of discourse.
Susan Handelman, The Slayers of 
Moses.
Few topics are as suited for a celebration of Walter Ong’s 
intellectual accomplishment as the Logos, for the Word in its 
kaleidoscopic manifestations and intriguing transformations constitutes 
the center of his lifelong scholarly attention. A masterful practitioner 
of words himself, he has repatterned the entire paradigm of Logos and 
logoi toward a new synthesis, the relevance of which extends beyond 
the broad range of the humanities and social sciences to the so-called 
hard sciences that shape our technocratic world. The Logos of the fourth 
gospel has served as a forceful intellectual stimulus both in biblical 
studies and in philosophical, theological deliberations on language and 
metaphysics. We wish here to pursue the study of the Logos in these 
two areas of biblical exegesis and philosophical, theological refl ection. 
Because Ong’s work has awakened sensibilities that are all too often left 
dormant in academia, it is incumbent on us to
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honor him by thinking through the issue of the Logos in a novel 
manner.
I
From Charismatic Speech to Narrative Gospel
Among the numerous studies of the Logos in the prologue to the 
fourth gospel the genetic question has principally claimed the attention 
of biblical scholars. This question is motivated by the conviction 
that genuine progress toward understanding John’s Logos hinges on 
discovering its historical and philosophical background. The scholarly 
literature abounds with suggestions ranging from the ancient Hebrew 
notion of the creative function of dabar (=word) to Jewish Wisdom, and 
on to the Hellenistic philosophical traditions of a Philo, of Stoicism, 
Neoplatonism, and Neopythagoreanism, all the way to an assumed 
redeemer myth of gnostic persuasion. At present, Jewish Wisdom is the 
favorite candidate. It provides us with a key to the principal operations 
of the Logos in John’s narrative scenario: preexistence, participation 
in creation, descent into a hostile world, proclamation of revelation, 
rejection and homelessness, and return to the heavenly abode. Within 
limits the genetic approach proves helpful. It also begs a number of 
crucial questions. Left unanswered is the question of a Johannine 
motivation for adopting the Wisdom model in the fi rst place. For in 
order for an infl uence to be accepted or absorbed, a situation must fi rst 
arise to greet it as an aid in interpretation. Left unanswered also is the 
fundamental issue of the identifi cation of Jesus with the Logos. Why is 
he perceived as entering the darkness of the world as Logos, and not, for 
example, as light, or as Wisdom? Why Logos?
In an important article F.-M. Braun has observed a distinct 
tendency in Johannine literature to move from the plural to the singular 
(1978:40-67). The plural commandments (entolai) culminate in a 
“new commandment” (entolê kainê); Jesus’ many works (ta erga) are 
accomplished in the work of his glorifi cation (to ergon); the sign of the 
loaves of bread (hoi artoi) gives rise to Jesus’ self-identifi cation as the 
bread (ho artos); the disciples (mathêtai) fi nd ideal representation in the 
Beloved Disciple (ho methêtês hon êgapa ho Iêsous), and so forth. On 
this analogy, it is tempting to assume a similar shift in emphasis from 
the many
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logoi to the single Logos in John’s gospel. One would, in that case, have 
to consider an intra-Johannine rationale linking the plurality of words 
in the gospel with the elevation of Jesus to the Word. A connection of 
just this kind is suggested by Polycarp’s agonistic outburst that serves 
as an epigraph to this piece. Highly offensive as it appears today, it does 
give us insight into the heart of the bishop’s anxiety. His indignation is 
directed at those Philippians who used the words of their Lord in ways 
that prompted a denial of the incarnation, of individual resurrection, 
and of future judgment. How is it that the words of the Lord could 
become the center of such a grave controversy? In all probability, 
Polycarp is faced here with a communal practice to let the words of 
Jesus be effective in their oral, life-giving sense. Words when spoken 
are bound to present time and in a sense advertise presentness (Ong 
1967:130, 168, passim). The oral performance of the logoi of the 
Lord likewise manifests presence. If, moreover, in the early Christian 
milieu the words are spoken prophetically, i.e., in the name and on the 
authority of the living Lord, they could be understood as effecting both 
the presence of Christ and communion with him. In this essentially oral 
sense the logoi are endowed with sacral quality. Consistent with this 
experience of an orally induced presence, there was next to no interest 
in Jesus’ past incarnation or in one’s own future soteriological status. 
In the face of this distinctly oral employment of the logoi, Polycarp 
counsels a return to the Logos as it was in the beginning. He clearly 
intends to redirect attention to the singular Logos, the authority over 
the plural logoi. His is a reductive move which, we shall see below, 
epitomizes the metaphysical bent in the philosophical, theological, and 
hermeneutical tradition of Western intellectual history. The analogy we 
have observed between Polycarp’s turning away from the logoi to the 
Logos and John’s predilection for that same authoritative singular, leads 
us to assume an oral, effi cacious operation of logoi in both instances. It 
is the kind of oral sacrality from which emergent orthodoxy in its bent 
for literacy will increasingly distance itself. One may suspect, therefore, 
a distinctively oral operation of sayings in John’s community which 
caused the evangelist to reach beyond the logoi, spoken by or attributed 
to Jesus, back to the primordial, personifi ed Logos.
The sayings tradition embedded in the fourth gospel is of massive 
proportions. There does not, to my knowledge, exist an
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accurate count. The Farewell Discourse alone (13:31-17:26), a vast 
collection of speech material, has been estimated to comprise one-
fi fth of the gospel. If one discounts chapter 21 as a secondary addition, 
approximately three-fourths of chapters 1-20 consist of sayings. If the 
passion and resurrection narrative is disregarded, approximately four-
fi fths of chapters 1-17 appear to be constructed from sayings (Sneller 
1985). In a study of Johannine sayings of a strictly proverbial nature, 
moreover, Kim Dewey has isolated and analyzed thirty-four proverbs 
(1980). Notably, his essay did not even intend to be exhaustive. So 
impressed was Dewey with the preponderance of sayings in John that 
he speculated the gospel may have arisen out of anthological concerns, 
the drive to collect sayings and to cluster them in sayings collections. 
However one may view the genesis of the fourth gospel, the immense 
amount of material that is oral in origin or by adaptation is plainly in 
sight.
Apart from the sheer quantity of sayings, John’s gospel exhibits 
a pneumatic, oral hermeneutic of the functioning of Jesus’ words. None 
of the synoptic evangelists equals John in that regard. The words, when 
spoken, are primarily regarded not as carriers of ideas or records of 
information, but as manifestations of power. They grant access to what 
is perceived to be real, and pose concomitant threats and danger. This 
concept of language as an instrument of control and revelation, of 
persuasion and condemnation is fi rmly situated in the oral sensorium 
(Kemp Forrest 1976).
Interestingly, the Johannine Jesus is described as a literate man 
(7:15: grammata oiden), although without formal, Rabbinic schooling 
(7:15: mê memathêkôs). And yet, the key to his person lies in the power 
of his speech: “Never did a man speak the way this man speaks” (7:46). 
When we read that his words are in effect “Spirit and life” (6:63), and 
powered to cleanse hearers (15:3), we know that we move in a world 
in which language, i.e., spoken words, are a mode of action, an event. 
Hearing his words and believing or keeping them is a matter of life 
and death. “Truly, truly, I say to you, if anyone keeps my words, he 
shall never see (or taste) death” (8:51, 52). A version of this saying 
is found in the gospel of Thomas, a sayings or cluster gospel, placed 
there programmatically at the outset of 114 sayings: “Whoever fi nds 
the explanation of these words will not taste death.” Whether it is with 
Thomas a matter of deciphering and interpreting the sayings, or with 
John a matter of hearing and
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observing them, they are in each case understood to give life and 
transcend death. Appropriately, Simon Peter’s confession identifi es 
Jesus as dominical speaker whose words hold the key to life: “Lord, to 
whom shall we go? You have words of eternal life” (6:68). The authority 
of Jesus the speaker is strengthened and the prestige of his message is 
enhanced by the repeated affi rmation that he speaks not his own words, 
but those he has heard from the Father (8:26; 15:15). Based on this 
logic, the words he utters and his audience hears are perceived to be 
the words of God (3:34). What matters about words is less what they 
say and more what they do. It is a principle enforced in John’s gospel 
as Jesus the speaker makes disciples of those who abide by his words 
(8:31-32). The power of his words relates hearers to the speaker through 
the bond of discipleship. Again, words are less carriers of ideational 
content to be received and transported by individuals than a means of 
creating community and unity. Such is the authority of his words that 
they work for better and for worse. They can cause division among those 
who reject and others who accept (10:19-21), and bring about judgment 
upon the former (12:48). Considering the effects his words may have, 
they can be disregarded only with the gravest of consequences. In short, 
Jesus’ words in the fourth gospel are not conceived as signs committed 
to space but as vocalization, and not as content encased in texts but as 
events in time effecting life as well as condemnation.
One of the most characteristic forms of speech in John’s gospel 
is the egô eimi saying. As is well known, the fourth gospel carries more 
“I am” sayings than any of the synoptic gospels. At frequent intervals 
the Johannine Jesus employs the self-authenticating formula, “I am the 
Light of the World” (8:12), “I am the Good Shepherd” (10:11), “I am the 
Bread of Life” (6:35, 48), “I am the Resurrection and the Life” (11:25), 
and so forth. One may presume here a classic oral principle in operation 
according to which the speaker of words is as important as the message 
he delivers. In a comparable, though extravagant sense, Jesus the speaker 
of words of revelation acquires the status of revelation himself. It is this 
extravagant sense, however, that requires additional explanation. In the 
ancient Near Eastern and Hellenistic world, gods and goddesses, or their 
prophetic spokespersons, manifested themselves by way of egô eimi 
language. In the early Christian tradition it was primarily prophets who 
employed this self-authenticating form of speech (Woll 1981:150-51,
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n. 11). It is fair to assume that the egô eimi style in John carries similar 
implications. The Jesus who legitimates himself by way of egô eimi 
logoi speaks not only authoritative language, but specifi cally prophetic 
language. He speaks rather like an early Christian prophet.
Prophecy is a category that has shaped crucial features of the 
Johannine Jesus (Aune 1972:88, passim; Boring 1978:113-23; Käsemann 
1968:38, passim; Michaels 1975:233-64). A classic enunciation of his 
prophetic function is found in the witness of John the baptizer: “For he 
whom God has sent speaks the words of God; truly boundless is his gift 
of the Spirit” (3:34). The verse delineates rather precisely the offi ce of 
the prophet. The sending formula, regularly associated with Jesus in 
John, designates him as the prophetic representative and mouthpiece 
of God. In prophetic fashion he acts as spokesman of the One who sent 
him, and as dispenser of the divine Spirit. Those who hear his words 
are invited to believe not only the speaker, but the One who sent him: 
“Truly, truly, I say to you, he who hears my word, and believes Him who 
sent me, has eternal life” (5:24). Word and Life are the principal goods 
negotiated by the prophetic speaker. Just as the Apocalypse was written 
by someone steeped in prophetism, and the Johannine letters grew out 
of a prophetic milieu, so also did the fourth gospel originate from circles 
in which prophetic, oral speech was very much alive (Boring 1982:48-
50).
The prophetic sending formula has deeply affected the narrative 
world of John. At the very outset, the baptizer himself is introduced as 
one commissioned by the highest authority: “There was a man sent by 
God, whose name was John” (1:6). As the baptizer is sent in prophetic 
fashion, and as Jesus is sent following him, so also will the Paraclete be 
sent when he comes to replace Jesus (14:26; 15:26). Sent like a prophet, 
the Paraclete manifests himself in a characteristically oral manner. 
“Every verb describing the ministry of the Paraclete is directly related 
to his speech function” (Boring 1978:113). Speaking and hearing, 
pronouncing and receiving, teaching and bringing to remembrance, 
bearing witness and guiding in the truth, glorifying and convicting, he 
fulfi lls the function of “a pneumatic Christian speech charisma” (Boring 
1978:113). Signifi cantly, the Johannine Jesus applies the sending formula 
toward the end of his career even to the disciples: “Peace be with you. 
As the Father has sent me, even so I send you” (20:21). Since in the 
fourth gospel the disciples constitute
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not merely the Twelve but the believers at large, the consequences are 
startling. Jesus represents the One who sent him (12:44), and in like 
manner, those who are sent by Jesus, the disciples, represent Jesus, or 
even the One who sent him (13:20).
This pervasive function of the prophetic sending formula brings 
us to suggest that we are dealing here with a projection of a prophetic, 
charismatic self-consciousness of the Johannine community. In other 
words, if we conceive individual believers as speaking words of Jesus 
in prophetic egô eimi fashion, then the Johannine Jesus and other fi gures 
in the gospel are to some extent at least “comprehensible as a projection 
(or retrojection) of the religious needs and experiences of the Johannine 
community. . .” (Aune 1972:77). One may thus plausibly contend that 
aspects of the socio-religious and oral-rhetorical milieu of the Johannine 
community have impressed themselves upon the gospel text.
There is an additional feature that we propose to examine only 
in the most general fashion as it relates to the gospel’s matrix. In his 
discussion with the Pharisee Nicodemus, Jesus articulates his own 
authority in the following manner: “And no one has ascended into heaven, 
except he who has descended from heaven, the Son of Man” (3:13). The 
statement has a polemical ring to it. There must not be ascent unless 
there is fi rst descent! It postulates the priority of descent (katabasis) 
over ascent (anabasis). The polemic is directed toward an assumption 
or experience of anabasis without prior descent. The context suggests a 
Mosaic reference (3:14). Moses’ ascent to Sinai, often interpreted as a 
heavenly journey, preceded his descent from the mountain to deliver the 
commandments of the Lord (Smith 1973:237-43). If the Mosaic pattern 
was one of anabasis followed by katabasis, the pattern instituted by the 
Johannine Jesus is one of katabasis followed by anabasis.
It may not be entirely amiss, however, to sense a reservation 
not only toward a Mosaic anabasis tradition, but toward a Christian 
anabasis experience as well. If Sinaitic theophany traditions were part 
of the Jewish legacy of the Johannine community, John’s specifi cally 
Mosaic polemic against a visio Dei becomes intelligible (Aune 1972:98-
99). This brings us to the visualist language which permeates the gospel 
alongside its oralist language. The seeing of God, and perhaps of the risen 
Christ, is an issue in the fourth gospel. But just as anabasis experiences 
are discouraged, so are also direct visions put under restraint. The
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prologue itself, for example, culminates in a severe restriction on 
heavenly visions: “No one has ever seen God at any time; it is God the 
only Son, even at the Father’s side, who has revealed Him” (1:18). By 
implication, the Son is exceptional in having access to the Father. As such 
he alone bears witness to what he has seen (3:11). A very similar view is 
expressed in the Bread of Life discourse: “Not that anyone has seen the 
Father, except the one who is from God; he has seen the Father” (6:46). 
Restrictive language of this kind appears to be designed to elevate the 
authority of Jesus. But if one inquires more deeply into the motives for 
heightening christology, one wonders whether the promotion of Jesus 
to the status of sole visionary is not meant to curb anabasis experiences 
among the believers in John’s community. Philip wishes to see the Father, 
and Jesus responds that seeing him (=Jesus) equals seeing the Father. 
It is a motif repeated several times in the gospel (12:45; 14:7; 17:24). 
It is worth mentioning in this connection that John narrates neither a 
baptismal story nor a transfi guration story. This may be signifi cant in 
that both accounts in the synoptic tradition depict the open heavens, 
a motif John appears to be reluctant to encourage. The only time he 
refers to the open heavens is in one of the most puzzling statements 
found in the gospel: “. . . you will see heaven opened and angels of God 
ascending and descending upon the Son of Man” (1:51). Whatever else 
this saying may mean, it does not promise individuals direct access to 
power, but rather a vision of the Son of Man as sole communicator with 
the heavenly world (Bultmann 1971:105, n. 3). Individual believers are 
advised to work through the one who possesses sole access to power. 
Hence, the one reference to the open heaven does more to curb than to 
promote ascent mysticism.
The social and linguistic world that emerges from behind the 
gospel is one constituted by the Spirit manifesting itself in effi cacious 
speech and perhaps heavenly visions. The preponderance and oral 
functioning of the logoi, the egô eimi diction, the egalitarian practice of 
discipleship, the prophetic shaping of principal characters in the gospel, 
and a preoccupation with accessibility to the heavenly world are all 
features that will have been nourished by a profoundly oral, prophetic, 
charismatic community. The believing disciples carry the logoi, speaking 
them in the name and on the authority of the risen, living Christ. The rite 
of baptism may well have played a greater role in this
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community than the narrative will let us know. Through word and 
sacramental rite the praesentia Christi inhabits the individual and 
communal experience. Perhaps the presence of the Spirit encouraged 
heavenly visions or journeys. When seen in this perspective one wonders 
whether we are not here in a situation similar to the one castigated by 
Polycarp. The deeply oral sense of pleromatic presence is ill-disposed 
to favor refl ection on Jesus’ past incarnate life or one’s own future 
soteriological fate. One lives in the presence of the Word.
One of the reasons for an exacting treatment of oral performance 
and communication, Walter Ong has taught us, is “not to reject the later 
media, but to understand them, too, better” (1967:314). In the case of the 
fourth gospel, a substantial measure of oral ethos has become absorbed 
into the written narrative. Yet the overall function of this gospel is not to 
produce an unedited version of oral verbalization, but to recontextualize 
orality, and to devise a corrective against it.
John’s narrative logic suggests that Jesus exercises authority 
by virtue of his heavenly katabasis. Coming from above, he is “above 
all” (3:31), setting a norm critical of unreserved anabasis mysticism. 
Descent also provides the presupposition for narrating the incarnate life. 
By elevating the earthly Jesus to normative signifi cance, the evangelist 
introduces a historicizing dimension and a sense of pastness that is not 
directly translatable into pleromatic presence. The focus of the narrative, 
moreover, falls on Jesus’ death which is interpreted as his being “lifted up” 
(hypsothênai). This “lifting up,” metaphorically understood as ascension, 
transforms death into the hour of glorifi cation (17:1). Signifi cantly, John 
does not narrate an ascent story in the Lukan sense of Jesus being lifted 
up into the heavens (Lk 24:51; Acts 1:2,10). In this gospel ascent is 
synchronized with death, and death serves to consummate the prophetic 
egô eimi identity of the Son of Man: “When you lift up the Son of Man, 
then you will know that I am he” (8:28; cf. 3:14; 12:34). When taken as 
a narrative whole, the gospel does not seem to benefi t the desire to gain 
full life in the present, be it through the power of the logoi or in visions. 
For the logoi are enlisted in the service of the written narrative. To what 
extent they can still be extracted so as to function in their lifegiving sense 
is an exceedingly diffi cult hermeneutical question. Suffi ce it to say that 
their principal responsibility is now to their new narrative world. And 
the norm set by this narrative is Jesus’
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life and death. Is it too much to assume that henceforth the way to life 
leads not through the sounding of the words, but through the silence of 
death?
Earlier we observed how some christological features were 
modeled after the fi gure of the early Christian prophet. In other ways, 
however, the Johannine Jesus distances himself from what he regards 
as excesses of prophetic self-consciousness. He does, for example, fi nd 
it necessary to protect himself against autodoxology, the drive to seek 
one’s own glory. Given the oral, prophetic matrix of the gospel, at least 
some of those speaking in the power of the Spirit could conceivably have 
developed a weighty sense of self-identity. Indeed, could not pneumatic 
speech and heavenly visions have engendered a feeling of superiority 
even over Jesus himself? This may be suggested by the intriguing Logos 
that the disciple shall not only do the works of Christ, but “greater 
works than these shall he do” (14:12). Against this background it is 
comprehensible why Jesus would lay down the rule differentiating 
legitimate from illegitimate successorship: “The one who speaks from 
himself, seeks his own glory; but he who seeks the glory of the one who 
sent him, he is true, and there is no unrighteousness in him” (7:18). In a 
similar vein, the Johannine Jesus twice counsels that “. . . a slave is not 
greater than his master; neither is one who is sent greater than the one 
who sent him” (13:16; 15:20). This is language designed to correct not 
merely the universal human disposition toward vanity, but the specifi c 
problem of charismatic self-consciousness. In this way, the Johannine 
Jesus, though modeled after the prophet-disciple, nonetheless sets 
critical accents with respect to a charismatic discipleship that placed 
itself above tradition and traditional authority (Woll 1981:80-92).
In the wake of Jesus’ anabasis, the disciples live under the 
guidance of the Paraclete. They live, therefore, in the age of the Spirit 
(20:22). Still, theirs is not a life in unlimited pleromatic bliss. They 
were clearly not in a position to return with Jesus to the place of his 
departure (13:33). “His access to the Father is direct, unmediated; 
theirs is mediated” (Woll 1981:31). To be sure, the Paraclete functions 
as surrogate for Jesus. Yet he can come only after Jesus has departed 
(16:7). He is, therefore, an altos paraklêtos (14:16), a successor not 
fully identical with Jesus. The time of the presence of the Paraclete is 
thus also a time of the absence of Jesus who is with the Father. For the 
time being, the disciples are orphaned (14:18). It is, moreover, one of 
the
118 WERNER H. KELBER
functions of the Paraclete to “teach you all things, and bring to your 
remembrance all I said to you” (14:26). This remembering activity of 
the Paraclete has no parallel in the New Testament and should, therefore, 
be taken seriously as a distinct concern of the fourth evangelist. 
Remembering entails a retrospective point of view. What is to be 
remembered is everything Jesus ever said. This motif is closely tied in 
with the narrative logic of the gospel. While the disciples are depicted as 
lacking full understanding during the earthly ministry, they are promised 
remembrance at the time of glorifi cation and with the coming of the 
Spirit (2:22; 7:39; 12:16). The Spirit’s arrival marks the hermeneutical 
turning point separating the time of concealment from the time of 
remembrance. This remembrance is more fully accomplished with the 
production of the narrative text itself, for it incarnates retrospectivity 
in a sense orality never could. It sets the norm for what is henceforth 
to be remembered: the Jesus tradition written by the evangelist and 
sanctioned by the Spirit (Woll 1981:103; Bultmann 1971:576, n. 2). 
This does not bind believers slavishly to textuality in the sense that all 
oral sensibilities are extinguished. One of the functions of the Paraclete 
is to teach what the earthly Jesus did not and could not say (16:12-13). 
Creative, pneumatic speech will continue in the age of the Spirit. But 
all logoi will from now on be measured by a norm, i.e., the authoritative 
record of the written text.
This brings us back to our principal topic of the authority of 
the Word in John’s gospel. We remember Polycarp’s anxiety over the 
Lord’s sayings whose life-giving performance left little, if any, room 
for incarnational christology, for individual resurrection and future 
judgment. The bishop had coped with what appeared to him to be a 
problem by defl ecting attention away from the controversial logoi to the 
authoritative Logos that was from the beginning. Not unlike Polycarp, 
John the evangelist coped with a world in which the sense and function 
of Jesus’ words were utterly oral. Responding to a multitude of words 
and authoritative speakers, John articulated singular authority by 
personalizing the Word and lodging it at the beginning. Once the speaker 
of logoi was elevated to the Logos, he assumed a position of control 
over the logoi material. Placed in authoritative position, the Logos took 
charge of the logoi in and through the narrative text. There is a sense in 
which the sayings, once situated in the narrative, are taken away from 
their speakers outside the text. Not that a text
 THE WORD IN ST. JOHN’S GOSPEL 119
can ever put an end to speaking. But when operating vis-à-vis a world 
dominated by the spoken word, texts create new worlds and set new 
standards. Whether oral in origin or by adaptation, most logoi are now 
put in the mouth of a Jesus who speaks prior to his anabasis. As such 
they are distinctly his own words, grounded, as it were, in a historicized 
framework. They are not, thereby, repudiated, but recontextualized, 
or perhaps more to the point, reincarnated into the new medium of 
textuality. Now the incarnate Christ himself harbors and administers the 
oral treasure. Seen in these perspectives, it may well seem appropriate 
that Jesus presides as Logos over a narrative that sets standards for oral 
proclamation and prophetic authority, and revises a christology and a 
notion of discipleship that are both deeply rooted in the oral matrix.
II
Logocentrism versus Textcentrism
Our thesis of the incorporation of the logoi in a text that is 
presided over by the Logos does not, of course, exhaust the Johannine 
hermeneutics of orality and textuality. We shall in this second part go 
beyond the shift from charismatic speech to narrative gospel, and focus 
attention on the status of the Logos as determiner of the text. Our concern 
here is with a particular philosophical and theological view of language, 
both written and oral, that entails the assumption of, or inspiration for, 
metaphysics.
Central to the hermeneutics of John is the notion of the 
preexistence of the Logos. Being with God en archê, he is situated 
prior to the realm of history and outside the reality of the text. In this 
position he constitutes something of a metaphysical reference point 
without which world and text are deprived of orientation. It follows 
that the text cannot really be accorded full self-referentiality, let alone 
ultimate signifi cance. This does not detract from our earlier observation 
concerning the normative function of the written gospel. When viewed 
in relation to the logoi, the text operates normatively. When viewed in 
relation to the Logos, however, it appears in a less prominent position. 
Subordinated to the metaphysical authority of the Logos, the text is but a 
transition, a detour even, toward what is considered to be real. In current 
linguistic parlance, John’s Logos is a typical, and perhaps the leading, 
case of logocentrism. Coined by Jacques
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Derrida (1976:11, passim), the term refers to the Greco-Christian or 
Platonic-Johannine tradition according to which language, above all 
written language, belongs to the realm of the contingent and imperfect, 
while true knowledge and being pertain to the plane of the immutable 
forms or the preexistent, personifi ed Logos. It is a school of thought 
which both derived from and contributed to the metaphysical tradition 
in the West. In our time, logocentrism has been widely displaced by non-
metaphysical and antimetaphysical thought in religion, linguistics, and 
philosophy. When seen in these broader philosophical perspectives, the 
historic nature of the Johannine Logos leaps to the eye. A useful way of 
highlighting its increasingly precarious role in Western intellectual and 
religious history is to discuss three schools of thought that are antithetical 
to Logos metaphysics: Rabbinic hermeneutics, the Anglo-American 
New Criticism, and the grammatological philosophy of Derrida.
To Susan Handelman goes the honor of having explicated 
Rabbinic hermeneutics vis-à-vis a Gentile, Christian, and specifi cally 
Johannine logocentrism. Her book, The Slayers of Moses (1982; cf. also 
1983:98-129), is a work of profound intellectual insights. In it she notes 
that Judaism, once robbed of its central place in 70 C.E., reasserted 
itself in the Rabbinic mode which cultivated the book as the new center. 
The Rabbis became the foremost experts in reading and interpreting 
texts. Theirs was a world of Scripture which called forth a relentless 
concentration on written words and their interrelations, “including 
even the physical shapes of letters and even the text’s punctuation” 
(1982:17). Intertextuality and interpretation was the condition of the 
Exile. There was no metaphysical escape from the text, no exit toward 
sacred place or sacred person. Interpretation moved from one sense 
to another, shunning the temptation to lift itself from the visible to an 
invisible realm of true being (1982:21). In the absence of extralinguistic 
standards of correctness, texts in the Rabbinic tradition “echo, interact, 
and interpenetrate” (1982:21). The Rabbis practiced and generated 
interpretation, endlessly searching and probing texts, often through 
methods akin to free association, writing commentaries on texts and 
commentaries in turn on commentaries. This “horizontal interplay” 
(1982:65) of interpretation created a space of difference and confl ict, 
of contradiction and cacophony, never permitting the many meanings 
to be gathered up into the one meaning. One does not move in Rabbinic 
hermeneutics, as one does in John, from the plural to the
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singular. There is only plural. All the elements in the text are potentially 
equal, the particular not being inferior to the general, and the general 
incapable of predicating an essence beyond the particular (1982:65). 
In classic linguistic, theological terms, words are never understood 
as signs pointing beyond themselves to a metaprinciple governing all 
language and interpretation. Words only point to other words. “God’s 
presence is inscribed or traced within a text, not a body. Divinity is 
located in language, not person” (1982:89). Meaning is accomplished by 
displacements in and of texts; it is not to be displaced away from texts. 
In this manner, Rabbinic hermeneutics illustrates the eternal desire to 
sustain the productivity of the text, revising it, re-creating it, reversing it 
in interpretation after interpretation.
When seen from the Rabbinic vantage point, logocentrism, 
the displacement of meaning away from the text, suggests the end 
of signifi cation, the suppression of the fertility of texts. This is the 
meaning of Handelman’s epigraph to this piece. A theology of the 
Word, transcending the realm of textuality and intertextuality, abolishes 
the space of difference, consummates desire, and puts an end to what 
matters most in human life: interpretation.
The kind of text-bound thinking advanced by the Rabbis made 
headway in the non-Jewish culture as well, putting logocentrism 
increasingly on the defensive. In academia, textcentrism manifested 
itself with intellectual sophistication in the Anglo-American New 
Criticism of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s (Ransom 1941). One of its 
ideological underpinnings was a formalist understanding of language 
which, when reduced to a simple formula, states that language, above all 
written language, has a life of its own. Culture and history are no longer 
taken seriously as a causal or contributing factor in the making of texts. 
Genetic considerations were held to be fallacious at worst and irrelevant 
at best as far as a proper understanding of texts was concerned. There 
is thus no way texts can either be reduced to or explained by anything 
extraneous to written language. They are assumed to be generated from 
no other order but that of other texts. Tradition, a signifi cant value for 
the New Criticism, was seen to be embodied above all in intertextuality. 
In this climate, the objective of literary criticism was to explore how 
words hang together inside texts and how they relate to words in other 
texts, but not to test texts against something before or behind them. 
Little, if any, attention was given to world outside of texts. What
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mattered was the presentation or transcription of world inside of texts. 
In one sense stridently anti-Romantic, the New Criticism served as a 
healthy antidote against naively psychological notions of authorship 
and crudely representational ideas about language and its relation to 
non-linguistic actuality. How texts relate to oral utterance, however, or 
how the structure of language and the texture of existence correlate, or 
at least interact, were simply not regarded as viable issues.
In view of its unswerving loyalty to the world of stable texts the 
New Criticism is in some quarters described as the product of a self-
absorbed, bourgeois middle-class mentality (Hawkes 1977:154-55). 
Perhaps this is too ideological a judgment that does not quite get to the 
heart of the matter. More to the point is Ong’s observation that the New 
Criticism was “a prime example of text-bound thinking” (1982:160). 
Treating texts as self-maintaining and self-referential artifacts, it 
bespeaks a desire to reduce language to closed systems. As Ong has 
made clear, this closed-model thinking epitomized by the textcentrism 
of the New Criticism fl ourished at a stage in the cultural, intellectual 
history of the West when the technologizing, objectifying impact of 
printing had reached a high point (1977:305-41). This requires a brief 
exposition.
Spoken words are bound to the authority of the speaker and 
inseparable from auditors and their lifeworlds. Lacking a visual presence, 
they are uncontainable in formal models. To regard speech as knowable 
in terms strictly of itself is a notion that has no conceivable reality in oral 
culture. Oral utterance cannot exist in transauthorial and transcommunal 
objectivity. As we turn to scribality, we note that ancient and medieval 
manuscripts were rarely, if ever, thought to be fully closed or to refl ect 
their own internal relations (Bruns 1982:44-59). Both the manufacture 
and use of manuscripts readily interacted with orality, be it through 
dictation or recitation. Moreover, handwritten texts were generally 
understood to reach out toward and communicate with readers, or more 
likely hearers, so as to please, persuade, or stir them to action. While 
chirographic culture was by and large unfriendly toward fully closed 
systems, typography, the art of printing, increasingly fostered closed-
model thought. With printing technical control over words reached a 
state of perfection unimaginable in scribal, let alone oral culture. More 
than ever words took on the appearance of objectivity and semantic self-
reliance. That language
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exists in the space of impersonal neutrality could become a perfectly 
reasonable and academically acceptable assumption. If we imagine 
centuries of interiorization of the typographic, objectifying management 
of words, we can understand in direct consequence of it not only the 
New Criticism, but also the Russian Formalism, different schools of 
structuralism, as well as the Saussurian principle of language whereby 
meaning is fi gured as relations between words and not as reference to 
something outside of them. When thus placed in the broader setting of 
cultural history, the apotheosis of the text as a closed system, and the 
implied fading of logocentrism, can readily be seen as an outgrowth of 
the typographic age.
Textcentrism sought and found its elaborate philosophical self-
justifi cation in the work of Derrida. Taking up a position of privileging 
écriture, he delivers in Of Grammatology (1976) an uncompromising 
critique of logocentrism. From this very textcentrist position he chooses 
to read Western philosophy and theology not as we did in terms of 
a fading of logocentrism and the rise of textcentrism, but rather as a 
stubborn clinging to the illusions of logocentrism. There is no disguising 
the fact that Derrida confronts us with abysmal depths or, as the case 
may be, voids in our being—if being were a concept acceptable to 
him. Few, if any, have refl ected more keenly and more abstrusely on 
the high-risk area of language, exposing us to its dangers, deceptions, 
and displacements. This one must grant him, as it must also be granted 
that he has never acknowledged familiarity with the work on orality 
undertaken by Eric A. Havelock (1963, 1978), Albert B. Lord (1960), 
Walter J. Ong (1967, 1977, 1982), and many others.
The subject of Derrida’s discussion in Of Grammatology and the 
principal source of his distress is the referential paradigm of language. He 
views it as a root cause of logocentrism. With force and great persuasive 
powers he inveighs against a longstanding convention of thinking of 
linguistic values as referring to something outside of language. Nowhere 
does he fi nd referentiality more subtly and insidiously entrenched than in 
the linguistic, theological concept of the sign. According to a prominent 
Western tradition, ranging from Plato to Stoicism, and from Augustine 
through medieval theology to Ferdinand de Saussure, the linguistic 
sign is defi ned by the signifi er and the signifi ed. In brief, the signifi er 
constitutes the visible marks committed to stone, papyrus, or paper, and 
the signifi ed the so-called meanings we attach to them. Whether we 
speak with the Latin tradition of signans and
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signatum, or with Saussure and Derrida of signifi cant and signifi é, the 
two constituents determine the character of written language in terms 
of a bipolarity of the sensible versus the intelligible. More implicitly, 
they suggest referentiality, treating language as written exteriority, the 
signifi er, capable of mediating the essential referents, the signifi ed, as 
long ago pronounced in the medieval dictum: aliquid stat pro aliquo 
(Derrida 1976:13).
As Derrida assesses the history of the sign in Western philosophy 
and theology, the signifi ed, the meaning attached to the signifi er, came 
to take on a reality in its own right. Indeed, its reality acquired greater 
prestige than that of the signifying marks on surfaces. One fell into the 
“naive objectivism” (1976:61) of attributing transcendental signifi cance 
and ontological status to the so-called referent of language. The 
signifi ed was assumed to be imaginable as a res or ousia, and thinkable 
as being “in the eternal present of the divine logos and specifi cally 
in its breath” (1976:73). In this way, linguistics collaborated with 
theological speculations on a presence alleged to be outside of signifi ers 
and summed up in the plentitude of the logos. This desire to ascribe 
transcendental signifi cance to the signifi ed, and to strive after parousia 
and underived origin, Derrida calls logocentrism, or logocentric 
metaphysics (1976:43).
Logocentrism, fi rmly entrenched in the linguistic-theological 
concept of sign, manifests itself in numerous dichotomies: body versus 
soul, culture versus nature, letter versus Spirit, form versus essence, 
derived versus underived, and so forth. What they all have in common 
is a craving for the “metaphysics of presence” (1976:49), making us 
believe that we live out of eternal verities and elementary unity, making 
us yearn for the underived origin, making us deny the derived self, and 
making us feel we experience full being.
One of those logocentric dichotomies to which Derrida 
directs his special attention is that of textuality versus orality. In the 
logocentric climate of Western theology, philosophy, and linguistics, 
orality has traditionally been treated as a transcendental signifi ed, with 
textuality playing the role of the signifi er. Consequently, the human 
voice transmits the elementary and unitary experience, while writing is 
consistently viewed as the outer face of it. The internal, truly valuable, 
oral speech is set above the exteriority of writing. Speech is assumed to 
be innocence, and writing fall from innocence. The pure originality of 
oral verbalization is disrupted
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by the original sin of writing. An artful and contrived technique forced 
itself upon the natural condition of the Word, violating it, and raping it. 
Writing is forced entry. The outside erupted within the inside, invading a 
living presence and violating the soul. In thus setting the autoproduction 
of speech against the alienation of written language, and nature against 
nature denatured, the Western tradition has tended to operate in terms 
of a “reduction of writing to the rank of an instrument enslaved to a full 
and originarily spoken language” (1976:29). Assuming the soul of oral 
speech, writing would always be humbled to being mere body.
In the end, Of Grammatology intends to erase the logocentric 
illusion of the transcendental signifi ed in whatever form one encounters 
it. Not surprisingly, the exposure of orality’s status as signifi ed throws 
us back upon the text. Engulfed by textuality, we are called in effect 
to replay the Rabbinic experience in its most radical sense. To have 
shown this connection between Rabbinic hermeneutics and Derrida’s 
post-modernist philosophy remains the superlative achievement of 
Handelman. As the Rabbis engaged in the interminable play with the 
signifi ers, so does Derrida invite us to “think of writing as a game 
within language” (1976:50). Both choose the exile of grammatology 
over ontology, which is either assumed or declared to be absent. For 
the Rabbis, as for Derrida, the text constitutes the space of difference, 
misspelled by Derrida as differance so as to protect himself and us from 
privileging language with fi nal reference. For written language is form 
and not substance. Lacking constitutive meaning, it harbors merely a 
trace which “does not let itself be summed up in the simplicities of the 
present” (1976:66). And fi nally, as the Rabbinic tradition postulated the 
preexistence of written language in the scroll of the Torah (shab. 88b), 
so does Derrida claim arche-writing (1976:56, passim), essentially 
suggesting that there was differentiation prior to unity, and lack of 
innocence without an anterior state of purity.
As we move toward the end of the twentieth century, with yet 
another holocaust behind us, the Rabbinic hermeneutic of deferring and 
differing has gained wide acceptance in modernity and post-modernism, 
while logocentric hermeneutic, the reduction of language and meaning 
to ultimate referents, appears more diffi cult than ever to affi rm. Given 
the present climate, the most thoroughgoing demythologizing would be 
the deliberate erasure of the Logos and the acceptance of exile in the 
space of written
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letters. Yet this cannot be the objective of this piece. Having experienced 
the power of the grammatological tradition, it behooves us to return to 
the logocentric gospel, and to relearn its textual valence, its treatment 
of the logoi, and its subordination to the Logos. In keeping with the 
orality-literacy topic of this paper, we shall formulate these concluding 
observations linguistically rather than in classic christological terms.
The presupposition of John’s gospel, as of all narrative gospels, 
is that divinity was incarnated in a person. While alive, this person was 
of course manifest, both visibly and audibly, to those who saw and heard 
him. A performer of deeds and a speaker of logoi, he attracted some and 
offended others. The sword of his mouth cut both ways. Oral utterance 
is capable both of strengthening human bonds and of severing them. 
A good many other hearers were puzzled and alienated. The riddling 
nature of his words has left its mark on the Johannine vocabulary (Leroy 
1968). Once his earthly life was accomplished, he continued exercising 
infl uence by passing fully into language. Charismatic speakers in the 
Johannine community resumed the genre of the logoi, speaking in the 
Spirit and on his authority. Using the presenting power of oral speech 
to full advantage, they rendered him present in the community, or at 
least they claimed they did. It was, however, a form of presence that 
precluded the incarnational dimension. Propelled by breath and attuned 
to the spirit, the logoi tended to promote the living, spiritual Lord to a 
degree that eclipsed the incarnate Jesus. Polycarp, speaking on behalf 
of orthodoxy’s rapid adjustment to literacy, had astutely observed and 
angrily denounced the performative powers of the logoi. The bishop 
interpreted the phenomenon as a “perversion of the words of the Lord.” 
Of course, stories must have circulated about this person, and stories 
have a retrospective bent. Still, as long as stories remain unwritten, 
they retain a contemporizing actuality. Spoken stories accomodate to 
the hearers’ present more than written ones. Full retrospectivity and the 
retrieval of a fully incarnate life followed by death is thus the achievement 
of textuality. In this sense, orality-literacy refl ections cast fresh light 
on John’s textual performance and on incarnation, this text’s leading 
motif. Medium and message are connected by the compelling logic of 
incarnation. The Jesus who is mediated through language accomplished 
his entry into the fl esh of humanity by full implementation of the powers 
of textuality. Linguistically
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speaking, the Logos incarnated himself in a hostile world by choosing 
the exile of textuality.
No text grows directly out of lived experience. Words are 
related to other words, both oral and written. The text of John’s gospel 
is conspicuous by the presence of a massive amount of speech material. 
Yet matters of orality and textuality have been curiously confused in 
Johannine studies. The last two decades saw a preoccupation with 
John’s use of other texts, primarily the so-called Gospel of Signs (Fortna 
1970; Nicol 1972; Teeple 1974). Inspired by the typographical model of 
intertextuality, scholars felt inclined to apprehend the text’s diachronic 
history almost exclusively in textual terms. A more discriminating 
assessment of the logoi tradition could not have overlooked the extent to 
which oral verbalization and values are stored in the Johannine narrative. 
Indeed, the gospel’s commitment to the genre of the logoi is far more in 
evidence that its reliance on another gospel text. As is often the case in 
the study of orality-literacy relations, the failure to come to terms with 
a text’s oral legacy in turn impedes apprehension of the text itself. In 
Johannine studies one tendency in recent years was to emphasize the 
textual nature of the history of the tradition, while another was to read 
the text itself as if it were an oral proclamation. Speaking on behalf 
of a majority of scholars, Ernst Käsemann illustrates the latter: “The 
praesentia Christi is the centre of his [John’s] proclamation” (1968:15). 
If this were truly John’s principal concern, would he not have better 
stayed with the oral powers of prophetic speech?
Lest we play lightly and loosely with the metaphysics of presence, 
this might be an occasion to dialogue with Derrida. Oral utterance 
evokes presence as writing never does. Contemporary electronic 
communication, termed “secondary orality” by Ong (1977:298-99), 
confronts us with history as an urgent present in a sense unknown to 
previous, print-dominated times. One could meet Derrida halfway by 
conceding that speech already represents alienations and pretenses, and 
that the ideal of presence is problematic when claimed for speech and 
hearing. This must not exempt us from exploring orality and literacy, 
their differences, relations and complex interactions, a task which 
Derrida along with many others has failed to undertake. For to postulate 
arche-writing without a prior grasp of what oral utterance was and is 
smacks of a projection of typographic sensibilities. When it comes to 
the matter of textuality, however, Derrida proves to be a
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safer guide, especially in advocating the incompatibility of writing with 
the metaphysics of presence. Texts cannot be entirely supportive of oral 
attributes and values, and often are subversive of them. The logoi, when 
placed in the Johannine narrative, are deprived of the kind of powers 
they exerted when spoken by prophetic speakers. Nor does the written 
text about the incarnate Jesus operate in the best interest of the presence 
of the living Christ. Incarnation mediated by textuality is one thing; the
praesentia Christi experienced in orality another.
Incarnation and textuality, one mediated through the vehicle 
of the other, constitute basic norms promoted by the gospel. Once 
the text is in existence and in fact privileged by canonization, it is 
inevitably caught in the chain of interpretation. The narrative that is 
itself interpretation engenders more and more interpretation. There does 
not seem to be an end to it. This is the grammatological destiny shared 
by all texts, including this one. Like any other text, the gospel invites or, 
as the case may be, condemns us to engage in the “horizontal interplay” 
of the signifi ers.
I do suspect, however, that for the most part of its history the gospel 
was read logocentrally. Hearers, or readers, let themselves be guided 
by the narrative dynamic to move from plural experience to singular 
authority. While text and incarnation were understood normatively, they 
nevertheless served the larger ends of transtextual realities. The text was 
thus not taken with ultimate seriousness. This is hard to comprehend in the
grammatological age which has come to view language and literature as 
closed systems. However, with the exception of Rabbinic hermeneutics, 
Western literary history has only recently begun to view textuality as an 
end in itself. What used to matter in Western literature was not primarily 
the intratextual construction of meaning per se, but rather the textual 
strategies to affect readers’ intellect and imagination.
Still more diffi cult to grasp for the age of arche-writing is the 
idea of the preexistent arche-Logos. Indeed, the very notion of the 
preexistence, according to which human beings are fashioned after 
some model that existed before they did, has no place in grammatology. 
In fairness to John it should be stressed that the Logos represents not 
an extralinguistic mode of authority, but an extratextual one. This 
gospel knows no pre-word or non-linguistic metaphysics! It rather is 
fundamentally Word-centered, and the
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Word undoubtedly epitomizes oral utterance. Again, what is unthinkable 
in the age of grammatology is not altogether alien to historical periods 
when linguistic properties were defi ned largely in oral terms. The 
privileging of the Logos in a time still dominated by orality should not 
surprise us any more than the privileging of writing in our own present. 
That the Logos incarnates itself in textuality and texts emanate from 
orality constitutes common thinking in antiquity about the relations of 
speech and writing. By oral standards, not even the personifi cation of 
the Logos is entirely baffl ing, for what typifi es oral verbalization is the 
inseparable unity of speaker and message.
Logos, fi nally, is also the appropriate metaphor for transcendence. 
Like oral speech, the Logos is ephemeral. It has at its disposal no visual 
or physical means of preservation. It is, therefore, inaccessible to any 
standards of measurement. Like oral speech, the Logos manifests itself 
in the moment of verbal action. Its prime potency is sound. As such it is 
elusive presence. These are attributes of divinity.
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